自然科学版 英文版
自然科学版 英文版
自然科学版 英文版
 

中南大学学报(社会科学版)
ZHONGNAN DAXUE XUEBAO(SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)

2021年07月第27卷第4期
   
本文已被:浏览344次    下载124次   在线阅读90
文章编号:1672-3104(2021)04-0096-15
 
论我国对欧盟卡特尔案件和解程序的引入与改造
 
焦海涛
 
(中国政法大学民商经济法学院,北京,100088)
 
摘  要: 由于卡特尔的普遍性与隐蔽性,如何优化卡特尔案件的执法程序,成为各国反垄断法面临的重要问题。宽大制度的适用使得更多的卡特尔案件进入执法程序,但也由此导致案件数量激增。为此,欧盟在2008年引入一种卡特尔案件的快速处理机制,即卡特尔案件和解程序。适合和解程序时,企业承认违法行为及法律责任,由此获得减少10%罚款额的奖励,且和解奖励与宽大待遇可以并用。作为一种案件快速处理方式,卡特尔案件和解程序对执法机构与企业都有益处,但适用中也存在一些问题,如确定性不足、企业可能遭受不公平对待、程序效率难以保证、混合和解面临适用困境等。我国也可在垄断行为规制中引入和解程序,但应将适用范围拓展至卡特尔之外,并通过增强制度弹性、限制裁量权行使、保障企业程序权利、提升程序适用效率以及限制混合和解适用等方式,确保和解程序既有足够激励,也不偏离程序效率的目标。
 
关键词: 卡特尔;和解程序;宽大制度;程序效率;混合和解
 
 
China’s introduction and reformation of the settlement procedure in Cartel Cases
 
JIAO Haitao
 
(School of Civil, Commercial and Economic Law, China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing 100088, China)
 
Abstract: Due to the universality and concealment of Cartels, how to optimize the enforcement procedure of Cartel Cases has become an important problem in the practice of anti-monopoly law in various countries. The application of the leniency system rendered more Cartels detected into enforcement procedure, which resulted in the drastic increase of the number of such cases. To solve this problem, the European Union (EU) introduced in 2008 a rapid settlement mechanism of Cartels, namely Cartel Settlement Procedure. Under this procedure, parties choose to acknowledge their involvement in the cases and their liability for it. In return for this acknowledgement, the Commission can reduce the fine imposed on the parties by 10%. Such settlements are compatible with leniency, which means that reductions under the leniency system and reductions for settlement can be accumulated for parties. As a fast and simplified way of solving cases, Cartel Settlement Procedure benefits both the enforcement agency and the enterprise, but entail some problems in application, such as inefficient certainty, unfair treatment on the part of the enterprise, insecure efficiency, and dilemma of application in hybrid settlement cases. China can introduce such settlement procedure into our anti-monopoly law, but its application scope should be expanded beyond Cartels. Meanwhile, by means of strengthening the flexibility of the settlement system, limiting the discretion of the agencies, protecting the rights of the parties, enhancing the procedural efficiency of its application and reducing the hybrid settlement cases, we can ensure that the settlements can be sufficiently stimulated, and that the goal of procedural efficiency can be maintained and attained.
 
Key words: Cartel; settlement procedure; leniency system; procedural efficiency; hybrid settlement cases
 
 
版权所有:《中南大学学报(社会科学版)》编辑部 
地 址:湖南省长沙市岳麓区麓山南路932号     邮编: 410083
电 话: 0731-88830141
电子邮箱: znsk@csu.edu.cn 湘ICP备09001153号-4