自然科学版 英文版
自然科学版 英文版
自然科学版 英文版
 

中南大学学报(社会科学版)
ZHONGNAN DAXUE XUEBAO(SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)

2019年11月第25卷第6期
   
本文已被:浏览443次    下载241次   在线阅读164
文章编号:1672-3104(2019)06-0058-07
 
“无主体”的悖论:阿尔都塞结构主义马克思主义观的一个审视
 
王文轩
 
(清华大学马克思主义学院,北京,100084)
 
摘  要: 从思想史的视角看,主体哲学与结构主义并非只是对立性的否定关系,而是还辩证地存在着肯定性的关联。这使得阿尔都塞结构主义的马克思主义观呈现出深刻的悖论:一方面,阿尔都塞认为只有宣告主体的彻底退场,才能帮助马克思主义摆脱理论危机,结构主义恰好可以提供这种理论支援;但另一方面,他对结构主义的痴迷却预设了一个更为隐秘的主体,这不仅重启了“意见”与“真理”的等级制对立,实际上又从结构主义走回了“我思”。在丧失马克思主义哲学的实践性之后,阿尔都塞必然陷入理论自证的逻辑悖论之中。
 
关键词: 阿尔都塞;主体;结构主义;认识论断裂;逻辑悖论
 
 
Paradox of the “Non-subject”: An investigation into Althusser's Structuralist Marxism
 
WANG Wenxuan
 
(School of Marxism, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China)
 
Abstract: From the perspective of the history of thought, Subjective philosophy and Structuralism are not just negative relations of opposites, but also a dialectical positive connection. This makes Althusser's Sructuralist Marxism present a profound paradox. On the one hand, Althusser believes that only the complete "exit" of the proclamation of the Subject can help Marxism get rid of the theoretical crisis, and Structuralism happens to provide such theoretical support. But on the other hand, his obsession with the Structuralism presupposes a more secretive Subject, which not only restarts the gradual opposition between "Opinions" and "Truth", but actually goes back from "Structuralism" to "I think". After losing the practicality of Marxist philosophy, Althusser inevitably falls into the logical paradox of theoretical self-certification.
 
Key words: Althusser; subject; structuralism; epistemological break; theoretical paradox
 
 
版权所有:《中南大学学报(社会科学版)》编辑部 
地 址:湖南省长沙市岳麓区麓山南路932号     邮编: 410083
电 话: 0731-88830141
电子邮箱: znsk@csu.edu.cn 湘ICP备09001153号-4