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自然科学版 英文版
 

中南大学学报(社会科学版)
ZHONGNAN DAXUE XUEBAO(SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)

2009年06月第15卷第3期
   
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文章编号:1672-3104(2009)03-0403-04
 
劳动仲裁的经济分析
 
黎克双
 
(吉首大学人事处,湖南吉首,416000)
 
摘  要: 劳动仲裁立法应当力图在公平与效率之间求得平衡,新施行的《劳动仲裁法》在仲裁案件受理范围、案件仲裁时效和案件仲裁管辖权等方面有了较大的改进,但在对劳动争议处理解决上仍然沿用了原来《劳动争议处理条例》的“先裁后审”的程序,从而导致了劳动纠纷解决机制的低效率和法律的空洞化。本文通过构建企业和劳动者为参与者的混合策略博弈模型,分析影响两者博弈支付的因素,指出了“先裁后审”程序对于保护劳动者合法权益的不足,而“或裁或审”的处理程序对于劳动者合法权益的保护更为有效。
 
关键词: 劳动仲裁;经济分析;程序
 
 
An Economic Analysis of Labor Arbitration
 
LI Keshuang
 
(Jishou University, Jishou 416000, China)
 
Abstract: The law of labor arbitration should keep balance between fairness and effectiveness. From May.2008, the implementation of “Act of Labor Arbitration” instead of “Act of Labor dispute resolution” that acted from 1993 has enhanced the settlement of labor dispute. But the mechanism that employee should take arbitration first before taking legal procedure remained causes the low effectiveness of the mechanism of labor dispute resolution. The paper established mixed strategies game model which includes worker and firm and analyzed the factors causing the payoff, and suggested a new mechanism that employee should have the alternative between arbitration procedure and legal procedure.
 
Key words: labor arbitration; economic analysis; procedure
 
 
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