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中南大学学报(社会科学版)
ZHONGNAN DAXUE XUEBAO(SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)

2015年10月第21卷第5期
   
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文章编号:1672-3104(2015)05-0154-08
 
民营企业官符独董履职效果的实证检验
 
易玄1,黄姣梅1,谢志明2
 
(1. 中南大学商学院,湖南长沙,410083;2. 长沙理工大学经济与管理学院,湖南长沙,410076)
 
摘  要: 近年来,退职政府官员担任上市公司独立董事现象频现,引发社会热议。对退职官员担任独立董事能否有效履职、对公司绩效能否产生积极影响等问题的解答,成为剖析“官符独董”现象的关键。选取2005—2013年民营上市企业为研究对象,描述了官符独董聘任和日常履职情况,并实证分析其对公司绩效的影响,结果显示官符独董尽管领取相对高的薪酬,但并不能有效履职,因而给企业绩效带来了消极影响,且行政级别越高,消极作用越强。
 
关键词: 民营企业;官符独董;履职情况;企业绩效
 
 
Can politically connected independent director of private firms perform their duties effectively?
 
YI Xuan1, HUANG Jiaomei1, XIE Zhiming2
 
(1. School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China;
2. School of Economics and Management, Changsha Science & Technology University, Changsha 410076, China)
 
Abstract: In the recent years, more and more retired senior officials tend to act as independent directors in private firms, which arouses heated debates in the society. It is the key to dissect whether these politically connected independent directors perform their duties effectively and whether they positively impact the performance of the firms. Taking the private listed companies during 2005—2013 as samples, the present study elaborates the employment of politically connected independent directors. The result shows that politically connected independent directors play the role of “vase director”. Although they receive relatively higher payment, they can not perform their duties effectively, and herefore bring a negative effect on the firms’ performances. Besides, the higher the administrative positions they hold, the stronger the negative effect is.
 
Key words: private firms; politically connected independent director; fulfillment of duties; firms’ performance
 
 
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